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Re-thinking What We Think About Derrida 
 





Although many still see Derrida as a thinker opposed to a unified systematic meaning, there has 
recently been growing recognition that Derrida, in his later years, suggested that his work is not 
averse to formalisation. In support of this view, this paper points out that, in 1990, Derrida 
himself told us that his first work of 1954 reveals a “law” which impels his career, and that some 
responses had arisen even there. Some benefits of adopting such a common pole are set out, and 
an interrelated “system” developed to relate the law of 1954 to the later responses, in order to 
help find a common, systematic base for Derrida’s oeuvre. The need to accommodate approaches 
which are wary of a systematic approach is nevertheless acknowledged, and possible ways of 
reconciling the diverse readings of Derrida’s intent and collaboratively furthering the 






It is perhaps fair to observe that Derrida’s work 
accommodates many viewpoints. That said, one 
might also observe that such accommodation of itself 
provides no imperative for particular views to agree, 
and often they have not. This paper seeks to work 
toward a general basis for reconciliation by pointing 
out that Derrida tells us that one “law” drove his 
oeuvre since his first long work of 1954. Furthermore, 
since Derrida himself tells us that some of his mature 
responses had arisen there, I will suggest one platform 
from which such reconciliation could proceed. In 
1990, in re-introducing what was originally written as 
his dissertation for the diplôme d’études supérieures 
awarded in 1954, Le Problème de la Genèse dans la 
Philosophie de Husserl, Derrida tells us that it 
 
refers to a sort of law [and] since then, even 
in its literal formulation, this law will not 
have stopped commanding everything I 
have tried to prove. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 
vi/2003, p. xiv; Derrida’s emphasis) 
Derrida then relates this to his term “contamination”1 
(employed in 1954 on p. xl), asking “why the very 
word ‘contamination’ has not stopped imposing itself 
on me from thence forward” (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 
vii/2003, p. xv). 
 
It follows that drawing out some elements of 
Derrida’s approach to contamination could, in regard 
to the “law” pointed to, provide a basis for the 
formalisation of Derrida’s oeuvre. As no thinkers, as 
far as I am aware, have mentioned this law, this paper 
will first suggest why adopting it would be beneficial, 
and then how it could serve to develop such a base. 
 
An immediate area of application is to historical 
divides. For example, the radical consequences of 
Derrida’s theory were first embraced by theorists of 
comparative literature and discourse.2 From the late 
                                                 
1  cf. Derrida, 1973a, pp. 20, 22; 1976, pp. 30, 34; 1965, p. 
1036; 1978a, p. 128; 1993b, p. 7; 1996, p. 24. 
2 Leavey & Allison (in Derrida, 1978b, pp. 186-193) 
provide a bibliography of over 180 articles on Derrida 
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1960s, these readers began to highlight Derrida’s 
interest in the work of Saussure, while equating him 
with those thinkers labelled “post-structuralist”. A 
schism appeared in 1986 with the first works claiming 
Derrida for philosophical consideration.3 But even the 
latter pole is hardly homogenous. In the past decade, 
Derrida’s primary influence has been attributed to 
Kant, Rousseau, Nietszche, Freud, Heidegger, 
Blanchot, Husserl and Hegel.4 Here, a shared pole 
might allow dialogue across the multiple and 
fragmentary divides. For indeed, none of these views 
has yet taken Derrida’s primary arbiter to be himself. 
Yet, if Derrida is taken at his word, and such a law 
applies, then any and multiple influences could be 
recognised, simply by asking how they accord with 
Derrida’s basic interest. This would hold equally for 
Husserl. Since the late 1990s, there has been 
increasing recognition that, for the first eight years of 
his career, Derrida produced works only on Husserl.5 
Nevertheless, finding a Derrida with his own foci 
from the first need not limit him to phenomenology;6 
rather one could ask how Derrida’s work developed 
into its multiplicity of interests. To that end, there has 
indeed been a recent groundswell of advocates of a 
systematic approach to Derrida – buoyed, to be sure, 
by his own suggestions in this regard. In 1996, for 
example, in a modified version of the paper delivered 
at Colloque de Cerisy in 1992 and subsequently 
translated by Dutoit in 1993, Derrida pointed in 
Apories to sixteen of his works and suggested: 
 
                                                                          
published up to that date, the majority to do with writing, 
language, discourse theory or structuralism. Comparisons 
to Husserl are few (cf. Allison, 1974; Benoist, 1969; 
Deguy, 1963; Schérer, 1968; Smith, 1967), perhaps as 
Derrida’s earliest work was unavailable.  
3 cf. Gasché (1986), Llewelyn (1986), and also Caputo 
(1987) and Harvey (1986), for a summary of these works. 
For a response to Gasché, see Sprinker (1986). 
4 Hart (2007, p. 419) sees Derrida as Kantian after 1970. 
Ferraris (1997/2001, p. 134) sees Derrida’s heroes as 
Rousseau and Nietszche. Michaud (2002, p. 69) sees 
Blanchot’s influence as important from 1967. For Lawlor 
(2002), Derrida’s “logic” emerges from Husserl, but is 
indebted to Hyppolite’s reading of Hegel. Mikics (2009) 
sees Derrida as drawn to Heidegger, Freud and Nietszche. 
5 See Derrida 1954/2003, 1959/1978c pp. 154-168, 1962/ 
1978b. Kates provides a bibliography of works from the 
1990s to 2002 (Kates, 2003, fn. 4) which address 
Derrida’s early engagement with Husserl, with Lawlor’s 
the most established of these. Kamei (2005) also provides 
a useful historical overview of Derrida’s earliest years. 
6 Hillis Miller, for example, recognises Derrida’s usage of 
Husserlian terminology in address to literature, but deems 
it “odd” (Hillis Miller, 2001, pp. 58-63). Given a basis 
from Derrida’s earliest years, such overlaps might be 
integrated. Derrida had, indeed, in 1957 registered a 
doctoral dissertation in which he proposed to relate 
transcendental phenomenology to “a new theory of 
literature” (Derrida, 1983, p. 37). 
One sees perhaps a plural logic of the aporia 
thus take shape. (Derrida, 1996, p. 20; my 
transliteration from the French)7 
 
While several bases for such an approach have since 
been set out, these are often incommensurable. 
Lawlor, for example, finds a basis for Derrida’s 
“logic” in Hyppolite’s view of Hegel, and Hurst in 
Derrida’s confounding of the phenomenological 
tradition since Kant.8 Without impacting on the value 
of these readings, a basis from 1954 might provide a 
neutral common reference point, by virtue simply of 
the fact that this work was written first. That said, one 
nevertheless should not proceed without caution. For 
an opposite school heeds Derrida’s earliest and most 
persistent warning: that a thought which presents its 
object as a monolithic structure is nearly certain to be 
misled. For example, in his first published article of 
1963, Derrida writes of such “geometric” approaches 
that 
 
[e]verything that defies a geometrical-
mechanical framework ... is reduced to the 
appearance of the inessential for the sake of 
[a] teleological structuralism. (Derrida, 
1963(a), p. 625; cf. 1976d/1978a, pp. 20-21) 
 
The warning klaxon was sounded right into the 1990s, 
where, in the same work that writes of a plural logic, 
setting out the conditions for its formalisability, 
Derrida writes:  
 
[a]s soon as [this project] is converted into 
positive certainty (“on this condition, there 
will surely have been event, decision 
[etc.]”), one can be sure that one is 
beginning to be deceived. (Derrida, 1993b, 
p. 20/1996, p. 43) 
 
Indeed, as a watchword for caution, notice the 
“perhaps” modifying the “plural logic” in the first  
quotation from Apories above (and which word was 
not included in the English version). The guarantees 
of this system should not be regarded as impregnable. 
Hence, if Derrida does arrive at a system, or indeed a 
“logic”, it would need to allow for a central thread 
which could evolve to critique the power of system. 
As a result, the approach would need to be simple 
enough to be common to any of these disciplines, and 
flexible enough to approach itself. Here, I begin to 
make the transition to my particular suggestion. For 
beginning with Derrida’s “law”, one could begin with 
                                                 
7 In Apories (1996), Derrida writes “On voit, peut-être 
s’esquisser ainsi une logique plurielle de l’aporie” (p. 20). 
Dutoit’s English translation of the earlier version reads 
“A plural logic of the aporia thus takes shape” (1993b, p. 
44), which does not include the “perhaps” (“peut-être”). 
8 See Lawlor, 2002, p. 88 ff., and Hurst, 2004, 2008. 
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extremely basic elements – the answer that “he” 
demands, whether this demand is met, and so on.  
 
As one might expect, such an approach imposes its 
methodical requirements. Principally, I aim to avoid 
anachronism, and thus only what is nascent will be 
drawn forward where required. For example, Derrida 
has not yet developed a “logic”, but employs only a 
simple inside-outside reasoning.9 He has also neither 
included signification and the limits of language (this 
begins from 1962: cf. Derrida, 1962/1978b, p. 66 
ff.)10 nor problematised the stable external position of 
the author. Hence this paper begins with very simple 
hermeneutic bases. Further, only the minimum of 
Husserl’s work – with respect – will be set out where 
necessary. This is also intended as a safeguard, for, as 
we will see, this young Derrida is no friend of 
descriptive phenomenology. Intent on his “law”, he 
relentlessly demands what Husserl since 1907 
specifically excluded (Husserl, 1907/1966, p. 7): 
absolute justification of the object despite the 
reduction. This paper, then, will be very simple. As it 
sets out basic relations, it is also reductionist; this 
does not, however, necessarily mean that individual 
examples are treated unfairly, but rather that they are 
treated simply for their commonality.  
 
I. The Initial Platform 
 
It remains to set out this “law” which drives Derrida’s 
work, and show how it arises from Husserl. The 
latter’s oeuvre had several aims – which, not 
exhaustively, include: tabulating the elements of 
consciousness, situating the regions of different 
sciences (as they are constituted in consciousness) 
upon a rigorous systematic basis, and accounting for 
the problems of classical epistemology. All of these, 
however, occur in a process of constitution, via the 
flux of the mind’s intentionality, in synthesis. Hence, 
in reintroducing his work of 1954, Derrida explains 
his “law” further: 
... the question that governs the whole 
trajectory [of his oeuvre] is already: “How 
can the originarity of a foundation be an a 
priori synthesis? How can everything start 
with a complication?” (Derrida, 1954/1990, 
p. vii, quoting 1954 [in 1990], p. 12/2003, 
p. xv, quoting 1954 [in 2003], p. xxv; 
emphasis added) 
                                                 
9 Elsewhere, I suggest some issues that a propositional 
logic might face in systematising Derrida (Galetti, 2010), 
but here I feel this is premature. 
10 In Derrida’s introduction to l’Origine de la Géométrie 
(1962) – his translation of part of Husserl’s The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology 
(1936) – we find his first address to language, writing and 
Husserl’s theory of the sign (via Hegelian examples). See 
Lawlor (2002, pp. 91-94) for an assessment. 
While in Husserl, as in Kant, the constituted object is 
intuited in consciousness in an a priori synthesis, for 
Derrida synthesis does not succeed. The key is the 
criterion he sets. Derrida later comments that what 
seems “most curious” in his approach of 1954 is his 
“concern for knowledge” (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 
vi/2003, p. xiv). Put differently, perhaps even 
shockingly, Derrida’s oeuvre begins with the demand 
to determine the object as entirely present. One might 
demarcate this from the “presence-seeking” which 
Derrida later attributes to the history of metaphysics, 
and also his later approach. While a more typical 
epistemology11 seeks to determine the object upon the 
understanding that it can be found, this early Derrida 
seeks absolute knowledge on the understanding that 
determination is not found. The Derrida of 1967 
recognises that even “it is not found” is undecidable.  
 
The Basic Elements 
 
This section thus sets out his interrelated parameters, 
which first instances are italicised. First, Derrida has a 
demand for absolute solution. As a result, he sets 
“either/or limits”: a “yes or no”, “true or false” 
outcome. This is bivalent, and thus the limits apply to 
an object reasoned about: either it is absolutely 
present or it is not. The limits will no longer be 
accepted by 1964, but for now: the “problem” is that 
the origin of the object is unaccounted for, leaving the 
demand for absolute solution unmet.  
 
The primary impediment to solving the problem – as 
Lawlor agrees – is that any intended object is “always 
already” (henceforth “already”) there to be found (cf. 
Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 13/2003, p. xxv). Thus the 
problem has a mechanical relation to presence. 
Amazingly, Derrida began with this issue in 1954. 
For a thought of an object 
 
will always have to be already there, in 
front of a passive consciousness whose 
presence remains accessory or accidental. 





in order to give a “unity of sense” to this 
[original] genesis and to its objective 
product, it has to be supposed present, and 
autonomous, before the multiplicity of acts 
of consciousness. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 
62/2003, p. 21; emphases added) 
 
If one is to unify (identify, in a priori synthesis) the 
given object, the “already” means that one must 
                                                 
11 cf. Condillac, the “inheritor of Locke” (Derrida, 1973/ 
1987, p. 29). 
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“suppose”– affirm – its presence. Given a demand for 
absolute solution, this is not acceptable.  
 
Shortfall and the Inside-Outside 
 
However, I add a second and related mechanism, not 
yet included by other readers of Derrida. A systematic 
interaction is deemed to fail absolutely if it does not 
interact with origin. But the “already” means that 
each interaction cannot find origin. Thus: intra-
systematic interactions fail to absolutely solve the 
problem. Derrida often uses this kind of reasoning. 
When the system interacts only with itself, 
 
[w]e remain on this side [en deçà] of 
absolute originarity. (Derrida, 1954/1990, 
p. 225/2003, p. 137; emphasis added) 
 
This will be called “shortfall”, drawn from Speech 
and Phenomena (Derrida, 1967/1973), where  
 
presence ... had already from the start [from 
its origin] fallen short of itself. (Derrida, 
1967b, p. 97/1973a, p. 87; emphases 
added)12 
 
I will set out the relations via Derrida’s own terms – 
nearly universal in systematic readings of his work13 
– of the “inside” and “outside” (Derrida, 1954/1990, 
p. 163/2003, p. 93; cf. 1967b/1973a, pp. 30-31). The 
“already” means that 
 
pregiven [objects] have only external 
relations. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 189/2003, 
p. 112) 
 
Their relations do not relate “inside”. Inversely, 
objects already here remain “on this side” of the 
external origin (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 225/2003, p. 
137). These can be united so: shortfall is a judicative 
consequence of the inside-outside criterion. If the 
origin remains outside, it is judged that the system 
does not meet the demand for absolute solution.   
 
Hence it is the demand to solve the problem that is 
not met; the problem is not that the object is not there, 
but that its origin is not accounted for. This will lead 
to the failure of affirmation and denial in closing. A 
mechanical relation with presence is thus set out: the 
demand to affirm origin finds, on its “inside”, the 
presence of an object which must be absolutely 
                                                 
12 In French : “la présence avait déjà commence à se 
manquer à elle-même.” (Derrida, 1967b, p. 97). A “lack” 
(manque) is also “a falling short”. 
13 Caputo (1987, p. 247) points out that the systematic 
readings of Derrida of 1986 (Gasché, Harvey, Llewellyn) 
are based upon Derrida’s work as “neither inside nor 
outside”.  
accounted for - but shortfall means that this is a 
problem. As can be seen, any term here can be related 
to any other. 
 
II. The Spatial and its Joints 
 
It must be noted that these are Derrida’s own 
concerns. For example, Husserl often applies a 
“reduction”, which sets aside consideration of 
relations in the natural world. This allows what 
appears to be described in consciousness. From the 
start, Derrida never believes that Husserl’s reductions 
provide exemption from the “problem”. For example: 
once the transcendental reduction has been 
carried out ... Husserl seems, implicitly … 
to put passive synthesis, pure and as such, 
in its turn into brackets. (Derrida, 1954/ 
1990, p. 232/2003, p. 142) 
For Husserl, once the reduction is in place, one can 
begin to describe how consciousness synthesises 
elements, including those that appear as seemingly 
passive objects. Indeed, phenomenology is supposed 
to begin at this moment (cf. Husserl, 1907/1966, p. 7). 
But, for Derrida, the passive content still requires a 
justification, as it falls short of its origin. He demands 
that phenomenology answer his own problem. Hence, 
none of what follows is actually about Husserl’s 
phenomenology. In this sense, Derrida never was 
Husserlian. He admits this in the printed version 
(included in Writing and Difference, 1967/1978) of 
his next public work, the speech on Husserl in 1959:  
[the reduction] brings eidetic forms once 
again to light, that is the “structural a 
prioris” ... in Husserl’s mind, at least, there 
never was a “structure-genesis” problem. 
Phenomenology, in the clarity of its 
intention, would be offended, then, by my 
preliminary question. (Derrida, 1959/ 
1967c, pp. 231-232/1978c, p. 156) 
This is unacknowledged in 1954. But, in the speech of 
1959, he goes further: 
Having taken these precautions as concerns 
Husserl’s aim, I must now confess my own. 
(Derrida, 1959/1967c, p. 232/1978c, p. 156) 
The aim he confesses is 
to reconcile the structuralist demand (which 
leads to the comprehensive description of a 
totality, of a form or function organised 
according to an internal legality ...) with the 
genetic demand (that is, the search for the 
origin and foundation of the structure) 
[which is outside]. (Derrida, 1959/1967c, p. 
233/1978c, p. 157; final emphasis added) 
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Integrating systematic shortfall with origin remains 
Derrida’s central concern. To do so, he tracks through 
Husserl’s work chronologically; I will begin with 
Ideas 1 of 1913.14 There, within a reduction, Husserl 
divides intentional being into the material (hyletic) 
and noetic phases (Husserl, 1913/1952, §85). The 
latter are the intentional processes which constitute 
essence without material input from the hyl . The 
noema is the “intentional content” which corresponds 
to such a noetic process:  
 
Corresponding on all points to the manifold 
data of the real noetic content, there is a 
variety of data displayable in really pure 
intuition, and in a correlative “noematic 
content”, or briefly “noema”. (Husserl, 
1913/1952, §88)  
 
But the “noema” is not a real object, with Husserl 
reserving his own term “reell” for the latter. One can 
understand this via Husserl’s example: the pleasure 
gained from looking at an apple tree is not real (reell), 
yet the tree would be real (reell), as it is perceived 
and gives pleasure (Husserl, 1913/1952, §88). The 
noema, however, is intentional, as it is constituted in 
consciousness. On the other axis, the hyl , which is 
supposed to supply “sensile” material, is real (reell), 
yet not intentional (Husserl, 1913/1952, §85). But, 
then, how could a noematic intention interact with it? 
Derrida applies the “already”. For it is 
 
because [hyletic material] appears as 
already constituted in its very being, prior 
to any noematic synthesis, that conscious-
ness can experience originary constitution. 
(Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 121/2003, p. 63; 
emphases added) 
 
The noema cannot interact with the outside. Indeed, 
Derrida takes the Ideas back to the natural inside-
outside sense. For, Derrida feels, by containing 
sensile matter, the hyl  also claims to convey what is 
outside itself: 
 
does [Husserl] not reintroduce, in the form 
of a “hyletic datum”, passively received, the 
transcendent object that he claimed to 
exclude ... ? (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 121/ 
2003, p. 63) 
 
Again, the reduction is rejected. The outside remains 
problematic. The hyl , as the “already constituted”, is 
                                                 
14 Derrida only glosses Husserl’s Logical Investigations 
(1900-01) here, and omits Formal and Transcendental 
Logic (1929), suggesting that his argument against 
Experience and Judgment (begun from 1918-19) applies. 
I will not address Derrida’s address to Husserl’s years 
from 1891 to 1900, or after 1931. 
also aligned with what is “passively” constituted 
(outside), and Derrida applies this across Husserl’s 
works: 
 
[a]s soon as the pure content of sensation is 
admitted [then is] not the theme of passive 
genesis, taken up fifteen years later by 
Husserl, already announced? (Derrida, 
1954/1990, p. 121/2003, p. 63; also cf. 
1954/1990, p. 233/2003, p. 143) 
 
Derrida is quite happy to simplify Husserl’s work 
across four decades to his own system. One 
recognises his commitment to his own demand. 
 
Pure Logical Grammar as Conventional Basis 
 
Now a basic Husserlian distinction is required. 
Husserl aims to provide a systematic basis for 
thinking, and thus his analysis sets out some of its 
basic components. His “pure logical grammar” 
(Husserl, 1900-01/2002, vol. 2, p. 71) sets out a 
formal interaction amongst judgment, logic and 
“ontology”. The latter are, simply, constituted 
relations of essences which arise from an intention 
directed at an “object”. Setting aside “form” until 
further on – “apophansis” is “judgment in the logical 
sense” (Husserl, 1913/1952, p. 371; 1929/1969, p. 
70). A correspondence between apophansis and 
ontology is drawn on the basis that thought 
(intentionality) has a universal logical underpinning 
(Husserl, 1913/1952, p. 409). To show their basic 
interlinking, Husserl employs a fundamental 
proposition of the form “S is P” (cf. Husserl, 1900-
01/2002, Vol. 1, p. 18). In brief, one predicates15 a 
characteristic P of the subject S. The latter, in turn, is 
the object of ontology. Judgment then follows from 
the logical predication about this “object”. One might 
think of apophansis simply as “judgment”, logic as 
“what one uses to judge with”, and ontology as “what 
is judged of”. While Husserl thought that these 
overlapped, Derrida is interested in their shortfall.  
 
First, Derrida addresses ontology. In brief, after a 
reduction, intentionality no longer addresses a natural 
object, and the general essence (eidos) is constituted 
instead of the natural world. From this, eidetic 
ontologies arise, which do correlate to a “world”. 
Derrida summarises: 
 
[t]he existence of the world is the correlate 
of certain experience-patterns marked out 
by certain essential formations. (Derrida, 
1954/1990, p. 145/2003, p. 79)  
 
For Derrida this presupposes what is already given 
                                                 
15 I use “predicates” instead of “asserts” in order to avoid 
confusion with the “affirmation” of a judgment.  
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even as an essence:  
 
always and essentially, eidetic reflection 
will presuppose an already constituted 
ontology. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 228/2003, 
p. 140; emphases added) 
 
The groupings of essences which demarcate how the 
world appears thus find that their existence depends 
upon a problematic outside. For Derrida, eidetic 
phenomenology itself fails because of his simple 
criterion. 
 
The Shortfall of Judgment 
 
The shortfall of judgment is apparent in Derrida’s 
analysis of apophansis in Experience and Judgment 
(Husserl, 1939/1973, §§1-16). There, Husserl deems 
the “world” a horizon of possible judgments, which 
appear as believed evidence. Apophansis needs no 
reduction, for judgment does not, ostensibly, deal 
with external objects. However, active judgment still 
judges of passive “substrates” of judgments. These, 
Husserl says, are antepredicative: already there. 
Derrida suspects that Husserl re-creates an inside-
outside, and thus a problem of origin. Secondly, this 
work inaugurates Husserl’s turn to “genetic 
phenomenology”. The object, Husserl says, contains a 
sedimented history of past judgments. These are 
“evident” to active judgment. Phenomenological 
analysis, from within the horizon of possible 
judgments, can then strip off prior judgments in 
regressus to explicate the object in progressus. This 
project, were it completed, would reveal the original 
judgment in its lifeworld. 
 
Derrida now turns to arguing that Husserl’s own 
address to the problem of origin does not succeed. 
The problem is that Husserl deems the origin pre-
given (Husserl, 1939/1973, §10). First, Derrida 
counters that predication of a “history” falls short, as 
any regression through sedimentations finds the 
object already given, and thus there may always be a 
further term. Moreover, 
 
it is not known whether the regression that 
has to be effected to return to 
antepredicative existence has to end in a 
sensuous reality or in an absolute 
indetermination. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 
193/2003, p. 114) 
 
Note, a fortiori, that this is indeterminate, and not 
false. For Derrida, judgment can neither affirm nor 
deny outcome of a predication. This will be furthered 
below. Here, it undermines the entire genetic project. 
The “passive” substrate of judgments – what one 
actively judges “of”, just as one judges of ontological 
objects – simply reproduces the most basic problem. 
It is 
a genesis that itself took evidence for 
granted, and which could easily be 
assimilated to a simple empirical genesis. 
(Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 186/2003, p. 109; 
emphasis added) 
 
Again, Derrida is willing to reduce Husserl’s work 
over two decades to the simplest inside-outside 
criterion. As a measure of their divergence, Husserl 
deems the precedence of the passive to be the solution 
for phenomenological appearance: 
 
anything built by activity necessarily 
presupposes, as the lowest level, a passivity 
that gives something beforehand. (Husserl, 
1931/1960, §38; in Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 
231/2003, p. 141) 
 
For Derrida, who does not accept the reductions, it is 
the problem.  
 
The “Joint”: A Mechanical Model to Understand 
Derrida 
 
At this divergence, Derrida’s system will be clarified. 
As he does not problematise metaphor until 1964 (cf. 
Derrida, 1964, p. 446 fn.), I will import a term from 
Of Grammatology (1967) – the “joint” (brisure: also 
“break”, “hinge”, etc.), which, we are told, underpins 
the way that all metaphysics, bound as it is to inside-
outside criteria, can be thought.16 The joint 
 
marks the impossibility that a sign [can] be 
produced within the plenitude of a present. 
(Derrida, 1967a, p. 102/1976, p. 69)  
 
The concept “joint” indicates both a separation and a 
connection. For now it is seen for its separation. 
Every object or structure has an inside and an outside, 
between which lies a “joint”. Thus, in a mechanical 
model, there are at least five directions to query: 
outside to its outside, outside to inside, inside to 
outside, inside to its own inside, and overall shortfall 
(everything to its outside). When one pole on any 
joint is taken as a locus from which to question – that 
is, as a hypothetical starting-point – then the other 
side is unjustifiable because of shortfall, and therefore 
problematic. Every one of Derrida’s arguments 
above, and likewise those below, can be treated as a 
direction upon a joint. 
 
I will show this in Derrida’s analysis of active and 
passive synthesis, the “most systematic” (Derrida, 
1954/1990, p. 215/2003, p. 153) aspect of his 
research.  
                                                 
16  See also “Implications” (Derrida, 1972/1981, p. 14). 
48 
This volume page number is not for bibliographic reference purposes
First, the outside cannot certify its outside 
 
The passive constitution outside cannot justify its 
presence from outside. That is, the already constituted 
is outside its own constitution. Thus – a problem of 
simple idealism – the passive cannot justify its 
presence: 
[t]he supposed transcendental passivity is 
thus not absolutely originary here and refers 
us to a preceding moment of constitution. 
(Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 198/ 2003, p. 118) 
“Preceding” here does not necessarily imply the 
“temporal” – for one cannot determine that an outside 
will be temporal (Derrida, 1954/1990, pp. 153-154/ 
2003, p. 86) – but rather “outside”, as “already” there.  
 
Second, the inside cannot interact with the outside  
 
Moving further “inward”, the active inside cannot 
connect with a passive outside, for 
the active synthesis that inaugurates the 
possibility of a piece of eidetic research is 
always preceded by a passive synthesis. 
(Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 235/2003, p. 144; 
emphasis added)  
The passive synthesis is already there.  
 
Third, the outside cannot interact with the inside 
 
Nor can the passive synthesis interact with the active 
inside. For example, Husserl says that the passively 
constituted is “not intentional”. The active itself 
constitutes the passive. But 
is that not precisely to include formally in 
the activity what is really and “in itself” 
foreign to the constituting intentionality? 
(Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 231/2003, p. 142) 
The passive is “foreign” because – for Derrida – it is 
outside constitution. 
 
Fourth, the system cannot reach its outside 
 
Next, there is overall shortfall. Husserl also says that 
there is something of the active in the passive 
(Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 199/2003, p. 118; cf. Husserl, 
1939/1973, §23a). But, assuming that the active is 
intentional and the passive is not, then the active 
could not be truly met within passivity:  
[t]o say, as Husserl does ... that passivity is 
a moment of activity is to make use of an 
abstract concept of activity. (Derrida, 1954/ 
1990, p. 231/2003, p. 142) 
Thus the activity in passivity remains outside genuine 
contact with the active. However, even if there were a 
real moment of the active in the passive (which 
Derrida would not accept), then the passive would no 
longer be passive: 
[t]he passive synthesis … is thus a 
constituting [active] moment of the unity of 
intuition. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 233/2003, 
p. 143) 
Even if the active does interact with the passive – as 
an entire systematic unity – the system still falls short. 
Derrida summarises: 
Why does any constitution start with a 
synthesis of passivity and activity? ... These 
questions, which were being posed from the 
very first moments of phenomenology, are 
still without an answer. (Derrida, 1954/ 
1990, p. 199/2003, p. 118) 
As a result, Derrida determines that, overall, “genesis 
is never met” (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 198/2003, p. 
117).  
 
Fifth, the inside cannot justify the inside: Form  
 
Given this shortfall, the “outside” is constituted inside 
only as formal. In an insistence on active and 
intentional constitution, phenomenology itself creates 
a formal idealism. But, in this phenomenology, even 
form is a problem, in that it cannot appear. It could 
do so only as an essence, but then the form which 
allows that essence to appear remains outside. For, 
given the “already”, 
if passivity [as form] is placed inside a 
constituting sphere of activity, the problem 
is only pushed one stage further back 
[outside]. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 123/ 
2003, p. 64; emphasis added)  
Not even form can account for its origin; it is the 
innermost problem. Form in any judgment, logic, or 
ontology is problematised. Thus formal idealism is 
created from the Ideas to the Cartesian Meditations 
(Derrida, 1954/1990, pp. 183, 232/2003, pp. 107, 
142).  
 
Alternatively, if form were somehow given from 
outside, then 
genesis does not start off … from an 
essence, from a predicate, but from [a 
passively constituted] antepredicative reality 
[and] one would have to admit that 
knowledge has made a jump, from the 
evidence of the given to the ... judgment. 
(Derrida, 1954/1990, pp. 183-184/2003, p. 
107; emphases added) 
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To allow judgment of a predicate (outside), the latter 
needs to “jump” inward (across a joint). Neither 
solves the problem.  
 
Parenthesis: The Method 
 
This approach to directions upon joints creates a 
method. An either-or choice sets the limits, in accord 
with a demand for absolute solution. This is applied 
to the outcome: it must be affirmed as absolutely true 
or false that objects which are predicated are either 
present or absent. Then Derrida poses a conditional: 
for example, “Suppose there were a completed 
passive synthesis” is the antecedent, followed by 
“then the outside would not be able to interact with 
it”. But the ontological element in the antecedent 
would not be acceptable in the first place. Moreover, 
neither would its “opposite”, “Suppose there were 
completed active synthesis”. Thirdly, even were the 
interactions to unify an object, the system would still 
fall short. 
  
Evident, therefore, is that neither side in itself, or in 
interaction, solves the problem of origin, and each is 
precluded in advance by the same problem; thus each 
side is posed hypothetically.  
 
Even in his first work (cf. Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 129/ 
2003, p. 68), Derrida calls some of the problems he 
finds “aporias” (I will touch on his later use further 
on). As he came to reflect upon his early use of the 
term, he drew it from Aristotle’s “diapore ”, as a 
situation where 
 
“I’m stuck, I cannot get out, I’m helpless.” 
(Derrida, 1993b, p. 13/1996, p. 33) 
 
Derrida brings himself close to this point in 1954. At 
every turn, he poses an either-or choice requiring 
absolute distinction of an object in active and passive 
constitution, when what Husserl clearly means is an 
interweaving constitution within the reduction. 
Derrida notes that Husserl  
 
... merely indicates the impossibility of a 
“language” that would distinguish strictly 
between passivity and activity. (Derrida, 
1954/1990, p. 199/2003, p. 118) 
 
Derrida’s method arises from his own demand.  
 
III. Temporising and the Joints 
 
The spatial elements now set out, we come to time, 
the seat of Husserl’s constitution (cf. Husserl 1928/ 
1964, §§16-17; Derrida 1954/1990, p. 159/2003, p. 
90). Here Derrida applies shortfall. In Husserl, the 
“presentification” represents a memory – let us say, of 
a dog barking – which is no longer immediately 
within sense-perception, and so cannot be indubitable. 
However, the retention, for Husserl, is a part of 
primary memory. Here, if the dog is barking, then this 
sound could pass through the now-point of my 
consciousness, yet be restored to experience 
(Erlebnis) by retention. This is indubitable, in that it 
returns immediate evidence (Husserl, 1928/1964, 
§§16-17; I §78). But, for Derrida, retention is shielded 
by the reductions from needing to answer origin. He 
begins: 
 
[i]t is an a priori necessity of the perception 
of time and the time of perception that an 
originary impression have some temporal 
density. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 120/2003, 
p. 62) 
 
Derrida insists on some natural time. He does not 
accept Husserl’s temporal reduction. Thus he rapidly 
simmers protention and retention down to his joints.  
 
Retentions and Protentions Cannot Justify the 
Outside 
 
To answer the problem, retention would need to 
present a real impression. Husserl, however, does not 
require this: 
 
Husserl does not present the a priori 
necessity of this synthesis [retention and 
originary impression] as ontological – and 
especially not real – but as phenomeno-
logical. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 120/2003, 
p. 62; Husserl, 1928/1964, §12) 
  
For Husserl, pure phenomenological processes have a 
special status as intentional but not real (cf. the 
noema, above). But Derrida especially needs them to 
be real: 
[b]ut so that this originary impression may 
be intentional ... must it not as such 
“announce” a real object that is constituted 
in the same way since it is aimed at it 
originarily? (Derrida, 1954/1990 p. 120/ 
2003, p. 62) 
 
Even assuming that a process were a real object, 
retentions fall short of the outside, as  
retention … implies a synthesis or a passive 
genesis of a new “now“, [but if] the 
constitution and retention of the past were 
active, they would, like any pure activity, 
shut themselves up in the actuality of an 
originary now. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 163/ 
2003, p. 93; emphasis added) 
 
Retentions, thus, shut themselves up “inside”.  
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Time Accounts for its Outside 
 
The joint is applied to temporal predication too. 
Given that, as explained earlier, pure logical grammar 
fuses logic and ontology, since absolute time is 
“outside” the ontological, this holds also in respect of 
what can be predicated of it. The objective time is 
thus antepredicative. At Husserl’s insistence, this is 
“passively received by consciousness” (Derrida, 
1954/1990, p. 201/2003, p. 119). But this passivity – 
as ontological substrate or received prior judgments – 
does not allow for predication of its outside:  
 
antepredicative time ... is still the 
foundation of absolute temporality, but this 
latter involving the coupling activity/ 
passivity, it is not known what is the first 
condition of its constitution. (Derrida, 1954/ 
1990, p. 200/2003, p. 119) 
 
Predication falls short of original time. 
 
Space Cannot Account for Time Inside 
 
Now – to unite the sections on space and time above –
space/time interaction also cannot account for origin 
(a systematic shortfall). If time is indeed fundamental, 
then spatial elements should devolve to original time 
inside themselves. Husserl “does not ask himself” 
(Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 161/2003, p. 92) this, and, for 
Derrida, 
 
at the interior [the inside] of the spatial hyl  
... , the problem of the constituting 
becoming is still being posed. (Derrida, 
1954/1990, p. 161/2003, p. 92; emphasis 
added) 
 
Note, for now, the word “becoming” (devenir). Time 
as becoming is not denied, but is a problem. For, 
similarly, fixing upon an object in time precludes its 
realisation, as one has only 
 
[a] suite of [moments of] objective time, 
whose genesis is already completed. 
(Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 202/2003, p. 120)  
 
Time, that is, has already become. This is a problem 
because, to be seen, an object or essence needs to be 
fixed, intemporal. It halts the sequence of time it 
should fit into: 
 
the temporality described is fixed; it 
interrupts the whole movement of constitu-
tion at a certain moment. (Derrida, 1954/ 
1990, p. 202/2003, pp. 120-121) 
 
In effect, space in constitution – as a cessation of time 
– is outside temporal movement. As Derrida explains 
in 1967: 
 
[s]pace is ‘in’ time [yet it] opens up as pure 
“outside” ‘within’ the movement of 
temporalisation. (Derrida, 1967b/1973a, p. 
86; cf. 1954/1990, p. 96) 
 
Secondly, time as become can only be found outside 
its own movement, and hence is not itself. Similarly, 
time cannot be objectified (spatialised) into itself 
(what Derrida calls “irreducibility”). It is always 
outside its origin. Since, for Husserl, space and time 
allow a priori synthesis, then synthesis is jointed in 
three directions: space is outside time, time is outside 
space, and the living now is outside time. Synthesis is 
not simple. This is arrived at mechanically: becoming 
is outside the temporal (living) intention which would 
fix its origin, and the having-become is outside its 
temporal origin. Therefore, Derrida says in Of 
Grammatology, spacing sets out 
 
the becoming-space of time and the 
becoming-time of space. (Derrida, 1967a, p. 
99/1976, p. 68; emphases added) 
 
The problem of “becoming” also arises from the 
earliest bases. 
 
IV. Forward and Backward 
 
This leads to a model which this paper will explain 
via the terms “forward” and “backward”. For, since 
time cannot justify its outside, it cannot account for 
its temporal progress: 
 
How can it be affirmed of a reality ... that it 
is lived before being intentional if absolute 
evidence is made into an intentional act? 
One has the right to determine the hyl  as 
lived only from that moment when an 
intentional morphé has come to animate it. 
(Derrida, 1954/1990, pp. 153-154/2003, p. 
86) 
 
The outside is beyond determination of either space 
or time. The origin of what comes from the “back” 
(earlier in time) is a problem. As will be seen, it 
cannot even be distinguished from what came from 
the “front” (a telos which appears).  
 
The Telos as Problem Forward 
 
Derrida sets this out in three areas – science, history, 
and explication of the object. In the Cartesian 
Meditations of 1931, Husserl introduces the notion 
that there is a “teleological ideal” of an ultimate 
science, explicated in phenomenology. Thus the telos 
is something that would need to be achieved by an 
intentional object moving “forward” in time. But, 
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Derrida argues, if an object 
 
managed to [achieve its telos], on the one 
hand, the sense that it would thus produce 
would not have its foundation in any 
existence, on the other, it would mark the 
end of its own becoming: two mythical or 
metaphysical consequences that would 
suspend the originary intentionality and 
temporality of lived experience. (Derrida, 
1954/1990, p. 232/2003, pp. 142-143) 
 
If the object had become, it would be divorced from 
its origin (foundation) in time. Time – posed 
hypothetically – remains outside the joint, and thus 
“metaphysical”. But, if the object were determined, it 
would no longer be becoming, and its undeniable 
temporality would be outside, and thus again 
metaphysical. The joint “forward” to the telos could 
be crossed only if time were set aside.  
 
Explicating the Object as Problem Forward 
 
Just so for the structure of adumbrating an object – a 
“thing”, for Husserl, being a kind of essence (cf. 
Husserl, 1913/1952, §15). For Husserl, a phenomeno-
logical object is given “in itself”, even if only 
partially, and then adumbrated forward in the service 
of knowing it completely (cf. Husserl, 1900-01/2002, 
vol. 2, p. 220). Thus a thing perceived at any 
particular moment, such as a table, for example, 
would be seen anew and more fully in the next 
moment. However, the series can never be exhausted. 
As Derrida notes of Experience and Judgment:  
 
intentional referrals are in principle infinite 
and, to that degree, never take on the 
absolute of their sense. (Derrida, 1954/ 
1990, p. 235/2003, p. 144) 
 
There is always shortfall.  
 
These arguments thus apply to any intentional object, 
iterated toward its completion. Explication will never 
reach the outside. Derrida later points out that Husserl 
insists on this inevitable shortfall himself (cf. Derrida, 
1967b/1973a, p. 101). But, in 1954, this is Derrida’s 
own demand. 
 
History as Problem Forward 
 
The problem of “history” – in theory, “backward” –  
is then set on this base. Regression toward the 
lifeworld should unpack a history, but the latter ends 
up being inside, as intentional alone: 
 
[h]istory will thus be only the intentional 
chain of meanings. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 
234/2003, p. 144) 
Since intentions are explicated forward, in the living 
present, regression and explication, in progressus and 
in regressus, become indistinguishable. For 
 
this infinite totality of sedimentations is an 
idea: the idea of an absolute and completed 
history or of a teleology constituting all the 
moments of history. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 
185/2003, p. 108) 
 
History is also a telos. Seeking for genesis in history 
and telos in ideal science, one structure emerges, in 
that they are both teleologised moments, explicating 
in inner time, with an undecidable object always 
outside. The teleological ideal already “precedes” the 
historical object: 
 
teleology could not be given to a concrete 
subject in an originary clear evidence. To be 
faithful to its mission, it had to precede any 
active constitution. (Derrida, 1990/2003, p. 
153; emphasis added) 
 
There is undecidability at front and back, “indefinite 
in its past and in its future” (Derrida, 1990/2003, p. 
143). What would come from outside – in the genetic, 
scientific or epistemological projects – cannot even be 
affirmed as “in front” or “behind”.  
 
That a temporised consciousness cannot distinguish 
between origin at front and back is still emphasised in 
Spectres of Marx (Derrida, 1994): 
 
what stands in front of it must always 
precede it, like its origin: before it. (Derrida, 
1994, p. xix) 
 
At least one part of the model of spectrality is already 
set in the 1950s.  
 
Ego and Object Differ from Identity 
 
This loss of the object applies just as much to the ego 
as object. In the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl 
wishes the “transcendental ego” to provide a basis for 
synthesis, by positing only what it already knows in 
“self-constitution”. But  
 
the transcendental ego ... is what it is solely 
in relation to intentional objectivities. 
(Husserl, 1931/1960, §31) 
 
However, Husserl firstly (from inside to outside) 
makes the transcendental ego an eidos (Husserl, 1931/ 
1960, §34). How then can it have intentionality to 
relate to existence? For 
 
[i]n separating the transcendental from pure 
existence, a constituted “eidos” is made out 
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of the first. (Derrida, 1990/2003, p. 137; 
emphasis added) 
 
The transcendental ego falls short of the outside. 
Secondly (from inside to its inside), the actively 
constituting ego could only be constituted by an ego 
which is already there (Derrida, 1990/2003, p. 141). 
The active, Derrida decides, has an “irreducible 
passivity” inside it (Derrida, 1990/2003, p. 141). All 
the problems of active-passive interactions return, and 
Derrida concludes that  
 
[w]e remain on this side of absolute 
originarity (Derrida, 1990/2003, p. 137; 
emphasis added). 
 
The ego cannot affirm itself as it falls short of its 
object. This is a base for 1967, where an Ego posits 
its own absence (death) by asserting its presence:  
 
[m]y death is structurally necessary to the 
pronouncing of the I. (Derrida, 1967b, p. 108/ 




[w]hat can look at itself is not one. (Derrida, 
1967a, p. 55/1976, p. 36) 
 
As noted, Derrida arrives at this reasoning by pointing 
to a “joint” in pure logical grammar between what is 
intended and what can be judged as found: 
 
[w]e draw this conclusion, then, from the 
idea of a pure logical grammar, from the 
sharp distinction [joint] between the 
meaning-intention [permitting apophansis] 
and its “eventual” fulfilment by the intuition 
of the object. (Derrida, 1990/ 2003, p. 97; 
cf. 1967b/1973a, p. 57) 
 
At this point – in both ordinary object (ontologically 
outside) and ego as object – there is a structure of a 
differing in identity, in synthesis, which resists 
affirmation of identity. This mechanic becomes 
fundamental for Derrida in later years, 17 as it is the 
ultimate source where a problematised subjectivism 
and objectivism become indistinguishable. All of this 
follows from the bases above. 
 
V. Synthesis and Contamination 
 
We can now draw the above toward the basic “law” 
                                                 
17 cf. Aporias: “[a]s soon as these totalities are over-
determined, or rather contaminated … they are no longer 
identical to themselves, hence no longer simply 
identifiable and to that extent no longer determinable” 
(Derrida, 1993b, p. 7/1996, p. 24). 
with which we began. The divorce from original 
certainty is a problem of identification. But the latter 
is the basic form of synthesis:  
 
the fundamental form of synthesis [is] 
identification. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 222/ 
2003, p. 135) 
 
Were an intentional object identified, it would be 
determined, in a priori synthesis, in an intuition. From 
the above – inside-outside and forward-backward 
joints – it is now clear that this synthesis will not 
occur. The “already” prevents basic identification. 
Positing identity misses “authentic genesis” (Derrida, 
1990/2003, p. 143). Synthesis and identity – intuition 
– thus becomes the locus of a problem.  
 
But, at this seeming death of all identity, I come to the 
next, crucial aspect. In no instance is a joint (a hinge) 
a pure scission. It would also be a connection. Indeed, 
Derrida does not deny that there is a basis upon the 
given in synthesis. When Husserl’s phenomenology, 
in 1931, becomes the ego explicating itself, Derrida 
says: 
 
there is the risk of transforming the passive 
synthesis, the only foundation of objectivity 
so far, the only certainty of an access to 
being as being, into a pure activity of the 
subject. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 235/2003, 
p. 144; emphasis added) 
 
It is undeniable, for Derrida, that there is being. As a 
result, the inside-outside is not simply a judicative 
criterion which insists upon failure of the given, but it 
also insists upon failure of the perfectly given; thus 
one cannot deny dependency. For example, it is only 
 
because [hyletic material] appears as 
already constituted in its very being … that 
consciousness can experience originary 
constitution. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 121/ 
2003, p. 63; emphases added) 
 
Derrida never denies the experience. Just so, the 
sedimented history of an object depends upon what 
must already have been given. Accordingly, Derrida 
continues by stating that 
 
phenomenological history presupposes real 
history. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 233/2003, 
p. 143) 
 
History itself is never independent of what was 
already given from the “outside”.  
 
Just so for time. As Derrida insisted, inner 
temporality does not escape natural (or 
psychologistic) time, for after a reduction 
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the autonomy it seems to have acquired is 
only a modality of its dependence. (Derrida, 
1954/1990, p. 184/2003, p. 108; emphasis 
added) 
 
Insofar as phenomenology is based on time, then the 
problem of origin is one of unsolved dependence. 
Hence this applies to every major relation. Shortfall is 
just as much a dependence as a failure of relation.  
 
This points to the methodical aspect of the problem: it 
is not givenness that fails. Rather, explanation of 
givenness fails. Instead of Derrida the anomist, one 
finds the most frustrated idealist, demanding an 
absolute solution without success, and thus bound 
within his system. 
 
“Logic” as Pointing to the Problem 
 
This system, thus, cannot determine (affirm) solution 
either way. Indeed, although Derrida only aligns his 
work with the word “logic” later,18 and does not 
assess alternatives, his basis does lead to one 
criterion:  
 
In all good logic, the absolute ante-
predicative must not receive any 
determination. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 190/ 
2003, p. 112; emphasis added) 
 
Husserl – who allows the antepredicative (outside) to 
be a substrate of judgment – does not use a ‘good’ 
logic. The word “determination” already appears, as a 
caveat against careless affirmation of the outside, for  
 
[d]eterminations, … referring to a pregiven 
with which they have only external 
[outside] relations, are then perforce 
conventional. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 190/ 
2003, p. 112; emphases added) 
 
Logic should not determine what is outside, on pain 
of being “conventional”. Derrida already takes an 
“unconventional” stance toward judgment. First, his 
either/or limit allows only affirmation or denial. But 
when he seeks to affirm an identity, an outside 
prevents determination. Further, when he attempts to 
deny the outcome, he is reminded of the dependency. 
Apophantically, one cannot affirm or deny that an 
ontological object is present or absent. For, whenever 
one wishes to “respect originarity”, and thus “refuse” 
to determine the sense of an object, one finds that “it 
is not so easy”: 
by trying to strip it out absolutely, one even 
more nearly runs the risk of contamination. 
(Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 22/2003, p. xxxiii) 
                                                 
18 cf. Derrida, 1972/1981, pp. 196-197. 
This is Derrida’s use of the term contamination in 
1954 – of which he reminds us in 1990 (Derrida, 
1954/1990, p. vii/2003, p. xv). The joint, which arose 
from either-or limits, does not permit denial either. 
This is reflected in “Différance” of 1968, when 
Derrida says: 
 
In this way we question the authority of 
presence or its simple symmetrical contrary, 
absence or lack. We thus interrogate the 
[either-or] limit that has always constrained 
us ... to form the sense of being in general 
as [ontological] presence or absence. 
(Derrida, 1968/1973c, p. 139) 
 
This applies, from 1954, to every aspect of the 
problem of origin.  
 
Return to the Basic “Law”: Synthesis and 
Contamination 
 
We can now see, in a basic fashion, why Derrida 
names the question which imposes itself on his 
oeuvre: “How can everything begin with a 
complication?” (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. vii, quoting 
1954 [in 1990], p. 12/2003, pp. xv, quoting 1954 [in 
2003], p. xxv). When there is no “pointlike” 
synthesis, then there is a scission preventing its 
affirmation. The problem of the “already” is 
unsolved. But this does not mean that one can insist 
on (affirm) even the non-pointlike, for synthesis is not 
a separation. Thus it is a “complication”. 
 
This allows us to go back to the beginning to see how 
contamination impacts on synthesis: 
 
All the [either-or] limits on which 
phenomenological discourse is constructed 
are examined from the standpoint of the 
fatal necessity of a “contamination” 
(“unperceived entailment or dissimulated 
contamination”) between the two edges of 
the opposition: transcendental/“worldly”, 
eidetic/empirical, intentional/nonintentional, 
active/passive, present/non-present, point-
like/nonpointlike, originary/derived, pure/ 
impure etc.) ... . (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. vii/ 
2003, p. xv) 
 
Every element can be explained by the process above. 
First, the transcendental is not real, and thus 
predication “falls short” of a real world. Second, 
Husserl’s eidetic explication is “outside” the 
empirical basis, to which it is nevertheless connected. 
Third, the nonintentional hyl  remains outside the 
intentional noema, preventing material data from 
entering pure phenomenology. Fourth, the passive, 
made non-intentional, severs affirmation across the 
“joint” to the active, without allowing denial. Fifth, 
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the essence ends up being a formal constitution 
without passive empirical givenness; hence the 
indeterminacy which prevents pointlike synthesis of 
reality (seventh). Thus, non-presence can neither be 
affirmed nor denied, and so on. 
  
Second, any major term in this system can also be 
reached from any other. For example, the “eidetic” – 
second, above – ends up being an active constitution 
without affirmable link across the joint to a passive 
outside, the indeterminacy which arises thereby 
prevents pointlike synthesis of reality – sixth – and so 
on. In every case, there is a complication of synthesis. 
  
This sets out the basic interaction by which 
contamination interacts with Derrida’s “law”. For, as 
Derrida continues,  
 
the quaking of each border com[es] to 
propagate itself onto all the others. (Derrida, 
1954/1990, p. vii, cons./2003, p. xv) 
 
Thus contamination is not merely a simple opposition 
of two limits which fails because they interpenetrate 
one another. Contamination is systematic. This can be 
understood by distinguishing outset from outcome. 
The problem is first posed within absolute  –  and thus 
oppositional – either-or limits. Only then does the 
simple opposition fail.19 Consequently, when there is 
contamination, this would be because all of the 
options – logical, ontological, apophantic, eidetic, 
intentional, and so forth – have a mutual inability 
either to be separated from or to solve the problem of 
origin. Contamination is a shared “relation” of every 
term via the problem of origin, as an “unperceived 
entailment” (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. vii/2003, p. xv). 
The unperceived would be separation, the entailment 
would be inseparable relation. 
 
Contamination as Prison 
 
It now becomes clearer how difficult, even 
claustrophobic, the “problem” is for one who 
demands solution. It is plangent that the young 
Derrida thus finds only a “prison” (Derrida, 1954/ 
1990, p. 183, cf. 231/2003, p. 107, cf. 142). For 
Derrida had  
 
tried to define in this way the [either-or] 
limits of the inescapable idealism of any 
philosophy. (Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 226/ 
2003, p. 138; emphases added)  
 
However,  
                                                 
19 It is often noted that the later Derrida seeks to avoid 
either-or oppositional logic (cf. Hobson, 2004, pp. 57-59). 
But here Derrida first imposes it in order to refuse its 
determination. 
[the] race toward the originary is perma-
nently and essentially condemned to failure. 
(Derrida, 1954/1990, p. 204/2003, p. 122)  
 
Derrida has revealed his own critical system clearly.  
 
Derrida’s Early Affirmation 
 
However, note that Derrida affirms the conclusion of 
idealism (thus determining the problem). His early 
work has not yet applied its reasoning consistently. 
Hence this early Derrida does allow a further 
“answer” – “dialectic”. It is applied to all of 
philosophy: 
 
Any reflection must begin by assuming this 
idealism [which ignores the “already”]. It is 
this which authorises us to speak of a 
dialectic philosophy as the only possible 
philosophy of genesis. (Derrida, 1954/1990, 
p. 226/2003, p. 138) 
 
Lawlor has already pointed out well how the 
ontological side of this outcome arises from Cavaillès 
and Tran Duc Thao (Lawlor, 2002, pp. 47-66). My 
point is that Derrida arrives at this via reasoning upon 
the joints: when there is a concern for knowledge, 
leading to either-or choice, an (undeniable) base upon 
time, and inability to affirm or deny of a joint, then 
dialectic follows. 
 
That said, Derrida has not yet recognised that the 
system which traps him in iterated inability to affirm 
or deny could offer some relief by refusing the 
affirmation in the first place. Thus he comments in 
respect of the passage from 1954 to 1967 that 
 
through these moments, configurations, 
effects of this law [the] “contamination” of 
the origin receives a philosophical name we 
have had to give up: “dialectic”. (Derrida, 
1954/1990, p. vii/2003, p. xv; emphasis 
added)  
 
Dialectic is “given up” – at least – because the 
absolute either/or choice which impels it (in 
apophansis, ontology, logic and method) will no 




While the relations in regard to particular content 
(eidetic/empirical and so forth) have been pointed out 
above, the system is more general, allowing for 
application elsewhere. Derrida begins with a demand 
for absolute solution to the origin of the object. But 
the object is already there, and thus never originally 
affirmable. Hence relations fall short, which gives rise 
to the “problem”. The absolute either-or framework 
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then sets the “limits”, requiring affirmation or denial 
from apophansis, and full presence or absence from 
ontology. This interaction creates an “inside-outside” 
distinction with an absolute criterion: only if the 
outside is solved is there knowledge. But, as the 
“already” prevents such determined presence, this 
leads to a method: “either” one element “or” the 
other, but neither may be determined in the first place 
(each is predicated hypothetically), nor may overall 
outcome anyway. Now, as constitution is the ground 
of the problem, this leads to (at least) three 
interdependent models: spatial elements fail to answer 
the problem of origin, as each element is beset by an 
inside-outside problem (a joint), the temporal model 
replicates the problems, and “becoming” keeps the 
inside across the joint from its outside. Front and back 
(telos or origin) become indistinguishable, as 
modification forward or backward (of history, genetic 
project, object) does not attain the outside. Ego and 
object become indistinguishable as problems by the 
same mechanism. These results, as egoic and 
apophantic inability to affirm (cross the joint), lead to 
the opposite side of the problem – presence cannot be 
excluded. Each joint is a dependency as much as a 
scission. Apophansis thus cannot affirm, nor deny, the 
logical predication, and hence ontological presence/ 
absence cannot be dismissed. Method thus can find no 
either-or outcome of an identity or presence. This 
creates the “law” that drives Derrida’s system: 
constitution never leads to “simple” synthesis (in any 
either-or limit). Rather, each element has a shared 
locus through the problem of origin, allowing each to 
depend upon the others but nevertheless to be 
separated from them. This interweaving is the system 
of contamination.  
 
Again, any term in the above can be reached from any 
other. One can understand Derrida when he says later 
that, when différance becomes a term substituted for 
the problem of origin, it 
 
can refer to the whole complex of its 
meanings at once. (Derrida, 1968/1973c, p. 
137)  
 
Conclusion, Context and Some Ways Forward 
 
This paper has suggested how an interrelated system 
linking Derrida’s early and later thinking might be 
developed from the “law” (or, at least, “sort of law”) 
of 1954 referred to by Derrida in 1990, and, as again 
suggested by Derrida, relating his notion of 
“contamination” to this “law”. The system set forth in 
this paper begins from the problem of origin of the 
object, a demand for solution, judgment, either-or 
limits, inside and outside, and shortfall from 
determination, and hinges mechanically on the 
directions and joints posited. While my approach here 
to Derrida’s work addresses “internal” imperatives, 
both internal and external approaches, of course, 
remain crucial. For Derrida is neither robot nor island. 
I have followed his “law” simply as he asked us to. 
 
As has been noted at various junctures in this paper, 
particular elements of this suggested model are not, in 
isolation, novel in the context of readings of Derrida’s 
later work (for instance, those of Leavey, Hart, 
Hobson and Hurst). No other reading, however, has 
yet, to my knowledge, drawn these elements back to 
Derrida’s early work, and hence could not yet relate 
them to the “law” of 1954, nor develop a basis from 
it. So, too, while Lawlor (2002) has provided the first 
thorough reading of Derrida’s path from 1954 to 
1967, Lawlor also omits Derrida’s “law”, and thus 
does not yet encompass, for instance, Derrida’s 
demand, and the interactions of judgment with the 
system. Hence my relations of shortfall, the 
directions, joints, and inability to affirm or deny, 
along with the method and the system, driven by the 
“law” of 1954, are, insofar as I am aware, departures 
from all readings of Derrida to date, pointing to new 
directions.  
 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to caution that, while 
Derrida in 1990 could refer to a “logic” applying 
across his oeuvre, Derrida in 1954 was as yet unaware 
of this and had, indeed, not yet understood its nascent 
method. One component in the task of joining the 
early work to the later would be following the 
coming-to-cognisance of this awareness.  
 
As to how collaboration could proceed, I will set out 
two ideal but related poles. The first is that of 
theoretical overview, and the second that of the 
historical. In respect of the first, I will here give an 
early and a later example. In Of Grammatology of 
1967, Derrida turns to question linguistics, asking 
whether speech can avoid “contamination” by writing 
(Derrida, 1965, pp. 1033-1040; 1966, pp. 23-30; cf. 
1967a/1976, pp. 30, 34, 41), that is, whether the latter 
can be kept outside, as Saussure (1916/1983, p. 46) 
wishes. Here, Derrida no longer “make[s] a choice” 
(apophantically), as a “Yes” or a “No” (bivalent) 
outcome, of a presence or absence (Derrida, 1967a, p. 
91/1976, p. 62). However, Derrida still poses either-or 
difficulties to Saussure, upon consecutive joints, just 
as he did to Husserl. For example, Saussure wishes to 
keep language outside the phonic – but then  
 
“the thing that constitutes language” is … 
unrelated to [outside] the phonic character 
of the linguistic sign. (Derrida, 1967a, p. 
63/1976, p. 42; referring to Saussure, 1916/ 
1983, p. 21) 
 
Again, Saussure wishes to keep the written word 
“outside” the natural relation to speech (Derrida, 
1967a, p. 51 ff./1976, p. 35), but the gramme and 
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phon  (originary units of possible writing and speech) 
become inseparable. Thus Derrida interweaves 
hypothetical problems upon the joint. He makes this 
interweaving clear, as 
 
[t]he outside bears with the inside a 
relationship that is, as usual, anything but 
simple exteriority. The meaning of the 
outside was always [already] present within 
the inside, imprisoned outside the outside, 
and vice versa. (Derrida, 1967a, p. 52/1976, 
p. 35) 
 
Hence “there is no longer a simple origin” (Derrida, 
1967a, p. 55/1976, p. 36). Yet the demand for 
solution remains: 
 
[t]he grammatologist least of all can avoid 
questioning himself about the essence of his 
object in the form of the question of origin: 
“What is writing?” means “where and when 
does writing begin?” (Derrida, 1967a, p. 43/ 
1976, p. 28) 
 
The basis still applies in the transition to Derrida’s 
linguistic work. As a later example, in setting out his 
first justice-law aporia of 1990, Derrida writes that 
 
[t]o be just, the decision of a judge, for 
example, must not only follow a rule of law 
or a general law, but must also assume it ... 
by a reinstituting act of interpretation. 
(Derrida, 1990/2002, p. 251) 
 
A judge – or better, a judgment – must be made of an 
object, the general law. But from inside to outside: if 
the judgment is made “after” the law, the origin of the 
law outside (before) is unaccounted for. Alternatively, 
if the judgment is made inside, the origin of the law 
inside its “re-instituting” act is unaccounted for. The 
judgment can be neither affirmed nor denied as just. 
Again, Derrida requires absolute solution, while each 
either-or term is posed hypothetically. 
  
The second approach is the historical, and this would 
need to be slower and more collaborative. For 
example, of all the quotes from Of Grammatology 
above, only one is an addition to the book version of 
1967 – the refusal of either-or choice (Derrida, 1967a, 
p. 91/1976, p. 62). The articles of 1965 and 1966 
make no mention of it. Indeed, nor does Derrida 
overtly recognise in the articles that the limits of 
either-or choice should apply to his own approach. He 
applauds Heidegger’s “crossing out” of Being as an 
“erasure” (for writing “Being” affirms it, even though 
it is a problem of origin) (Derrida, 1965, p. 1029; cf. 
Heidegger, 1956, p. 13). But only in 1967 does 
Derrida include his own erasure, and add that 
 
[t]he outside is the inside. (Derrida, 1967a, 
p. 65/1976, p. 44)  
 
It seems that the inability to affirm either-or choice as 
leading to erasure crystallised between 1965 and 
1967. A faithful historical progress should try to 
allow for this nebulosity, and chance of inter-
disciplinary overlap, to coalesce at its own pace. But, 
by the same stroke, it opens the way for such 
dialogue; here, it begins to consider the limits of a 
systematic approach, about which I cautioned at the 
outset. Hence I point to the above not to simplify 
Derrida’s work, but to highlight the hard path we 
would need to follow, by broader assessment and 
careful historical increments, in the task of preparing 
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